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Acid Brothers
Henry Beecher, Timothy Leary,
and the psychedelic of the century

Jonathan D. Moreno

ABSTRACT Henry Knowles Beecher, an icon of human research ethics, and Tim-

othy Francis Leary, a guru of the counterculture, are bound together in history by the
synthetic hallucinogen lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD). Both were associated with
Harvard University during a critical period in their careers and of drastic social change.
To all appearances the first was a paragon of the establishment and a constructive if
complex hero, the second a rebel and a criminal, a rogue and a scoundrel. Although
there is no evidence they ever met, Beecher’s indirect struggle with Leary over control
of the 20th century’s most celebrated psychedelic was at the very heart of his views
about the legitimate, responsible investigator. That struggle also proves to be a revealing
bellwether of the increasingly formalized scrutiny of human experiments that was then
taking shape.

H

enry Knowles Beecher, an icon of human research ethics, and Timothy
Francis Leary, a guru of the counterculture, are bound together in history
by the synthetic hallucinogen lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD). Beecher was a
U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel who received five battle stars, was inducted into
the Legion of Merit, held the first endowed chair in his discipline, wrote at least
three path-breaking papers, and is honored by two prestigious ethics awards in
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his name. Leary was a West Point dropout who was obliged to leave a research
assistant professorship, was convicted of violating the Marihuana Tax Act (a conviction that was later overturned), was sentenced to 20 years in prison and broke
out with the assistance of a radical left organization, and after being recaptured
did time at Folsom Prison. Both were associated with Harvard University during
a critical period in their careers and of drastic social change. To all appearances
the first was a paragon of the establishment and a constructive if complex hero,
the second a rebel and a criminal, a rogue and a scoundrel. Although there is no
evidence they ever met, Beecher’s indirect struggle with Leary over control of
the 20th century’s most celebrated psychedelic was at the very heart of his views
about the legitimate, responsible investigator. That struggle also proves to be a revealing bellwether of the increasingly formalized scrutiny of human experiments
that was then taking shape.

Tune In
In 1938, chemist Albert Hoffman was studying the chemical properties of ergot at
the Sandoz Laboratories in Basel, Switzerland, when he synthesized lysergic acid
diethylamide (LSD). The hallucinogenic properties of the 25th modification of
the chemical structure of ergot were unknown until 1943, when Hoffman took
it off his lab shelf and accidentally ingested it through his fingertips (BBC News
2008).This first accidental LSD experience was followed a few days later by an intentional “trip,” as the experience would come to be known (the term might have
been coined by an intelligence operative). Hoffman reported on his hundredth
birthday that it had given him “an inner joy, an open mindedness, a gratefulness,
open eyes and an internal sensitivity for the miracles of creation” (Harrison 2006).
Though he was enthusiastic about the potential benefits of LSD, by the end of
his long life Hoffman also believed that it had been misused by the 1960s counterculture, ruefully referring to the drug as “my problem child” (Hofmann 1980).
At about the same time, Nazi medical doctors were also experimenting with
hallucinogens at the Dachau concentration camp, where they administered mescaline to 30 prisoners in an attempt at what would later be called “mind control,”
but which seemed better suited to interrogation. After the war those experiments
came to the attention of the U.S. Naval Technical Mission, which was engaged
in identifying potentially useful German science and scientists for removal to the
United States, and to that of the new Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), which
was interested in various drugs to aid interrogation (Lee and Shlain 1986). The
CIA’s World War II predecessor, the Office for Strategic Services (OSS), had also
investigated potential “truth drugs” like mescaline, scopolamine, and marijuana
(Stevens 1988). From the late 1940s through the late 1950s, the CIA continued to pursue similar questions under project code names like ARTICHOKE
and BLUEBIRD. LSD was among the drugs included in a 1951 ARTICHOKE
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survey document, along with mescaline, morphine, ether, Benzedrine, and ethyl
alcohol. Often operating through “front” organizations to conceal the ultimate
source of funding even from the investigators themselves, a number of psychiatrists were given CIA contracts to study the puzzling and often unpredictable
effects of LSD. The project code-named MK-ULTRA began in 1953. Its project manager, Sidney Gottlieb, was interested in LSD’s potential as a disruptor of
thought processes, one that could be used against high officials. Over the next few
years the agency’s indiscriminate and often nonconsensual experiments, caused
considerable internal difficulties and disagreements in the CIA (including the
death of its anthrax expert Frank Olson in an apparent suicide in 1953), though
the “psycho-chemical” experiments continued (then mainly through the Army
Chemical Corps) into the mid-1960s (Stevens 1988).
Beecher’s connection to drug-induced interrogation and psychotropic drugs
began in 1947, when Colonel William Stone, attaché to the U.S. Army Surgeon
General, sent him the U.S. Navy Technical Report on Dachau and other concentration camp experiments involving cold exposure in cold water baths and
outdoors and high-altitude decompression experiments (McCoy 2007). These
experiments were included in the indictment at the Nazi Doctors’ Trial that led
the judges to frame what posterity knows as the Nuremberg Code. Then in his
early 40s, Beecher had returned to Harvard after World War II service where,
during the North Africa and Italy campaigns, he made the observations about
pain that led to his career-long interest in the placebo effect. As anesthesiologist
George Mashour (2005) observes, Beecher’s “work on LSD and the evaluation
of the effects was consistent with the broader context of his scientific inquiry of
psychological meaning and drug response that originated in the war” (70).
In October and November 1951, and again in August 1952, Beecher traveled
extensively in Europe to learn what he could from extant work on “ego-depressant drugs,” popularly known as “truth serum.” With a high security clearance
from Army intelligence, his ports-of-call included the British Ministry of Defense
in London, Allied Headquarters at Marly-le-Roi, and CIA German headquarters
at Camp King in Oberursel. Gradually Beecher focused less on mescaline and the
other drugs of interest and more on LSD (which was then viewed mainly as a
“psycho-mimetic,” mimicking psychotic symptoms), sending regular reports back
to the Army Surgeon General. Around that time he also received a grant from
the Army’s Medical Research and Development Board to begin experimental
work on LSD at Massachusetts General Hospital, work that was reported in a
couple of papers published several years later, each with several co-investigators
from his Anesthesia Laboratory. The Beecher team’s findings echoed what the
Sandoz chemists had noted in their own early experiments: a subject’s response
to the drug was associated with the subject’s preexisting mood, much as Beecher
had earlier observed was true of his wartime patients who were in need of pain
control. Although the notion that the “mind-set” and the “setting” are crucial to
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one’s reaction to LSD is often attributed to Leary, that observation had been made
by virtually all the interested experimenters (Mashour 2005).
However, Beecher might not have reported on all his LSD work. Both the
United States and Britain were interested in “truth drugs” after World War II, seeing in LSD a solution to the problem of deception in counter-intelligence operations. When Beecher’s eminent protégé Louis Lasagna was interviewed about the
experiments in 1994 by the President’s Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments, he said that the hallucinogens were given to healthy volunteers
without informed consent to “see if we could worm out of them secret information.” Lasagna said he refused to participate and reflected “not with pride” on
the episode (Advisory Committee 1996). Lasagna was a coauthor with Beecher
of a 1956 paper entitled “The Response of Normal Men to Lysergic Acid Derivatives,” a report on the ability of LSD to mimic the symptoms of psychosis (von
Felsinger, Lasagna, and Beecher 1956).The paper did not describe the “truth sera”
experiment to which Lasagna referred; apparently that was an additional experiment, a conclusion that would be consistent with Lasagna’s claim that he declined
to participate in that work.
There is no question that Beecher was in close and continuous contact with
Army intelligence and medical officials from the late 1940s to the mid-1950s,
but the precise nature of his relationship with the CIA under its director Allen Dulles is less clear. In 2007, a German television documentary alleged that
Beecher was responsible for CIA drug experiments (Koch 2007). According to a
vigorous editorial discussion between the filmmaker and a commentator on the
Wikipedia article about Beecher, this allegation was partly based on a paper that
was then forthcoming by historian Alfred W. McCoy (https://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Talk%3AHenry_K._Beecher). But McCoy’s paper, though highly critical
of Beecher, does not support that CIA connection beyond noting meetings in
which CIA officials, along with representatives of other intelligence agencies,
were present (McCoy 2007). The popular history of LSD, Acid Dreams, states that
Beecher “conducted drug experiments for the CIA” (Lee and Shlain 1986), but
the expression “for the CIA” may be taken to mean that the agency was his main
point of contact with the intelligence community, or that he was funded by the
agency. Neither theory seems to be supported by the available evidence. And a
history of LSD in England, Albion Dreaming, states that Beecher “had a controversial involvement with psychedelic drugs, having first been involved in CIA
mescaline experiments in Germany after World War II” (Roberts 2012, 44). The
words involvement and involved are sufficiently imprecise to allow for all manner
of relationships, from funding to correspondence. But Beecher’s routine contacts
appear to have been with the Army, not the CIA, nor does the agency seem to
have been his funding source.
It is a matter of record that the CIA engaged numerous psychiatrists and other
physicians, as well as psychologists, as consultants, many of whom are named in
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various histories. Had Beecher been one of them, it seems likely he too would
have been part of the definitive record. Based on the information available (and
it should be noted that many CIA records were destroyed by then-CIA director Richard Helms prior to Senator Frank Church’s 1975 investigation), the
agency did keep track of Beecher’s work and considered him an expert on LSD
and “brainwashing.” These internal CIA memoranda might be the basis for the
widespread conclusion that Beecher was a CIA operative. Through a Freedom
of Information Act (FOIA) request, anesthesiologist James Rathmell (2014) has
obtained documents from surviving MK-ULTRA files that show that Beecher,
with the support of the Army Surgeon General, attempted to initiate a dialogue
with the CIA in 1953 but received a cool response. One internal CIA memorandum implies that he was viewed by the agency as too prone to talk about his
intelligence connections. In effect, Rathmell argues, after one pro forma meeting
in Washington the CIA brushed Beecher off.
But whether Beecher was involved with one intelligence agency or another
is of little importance beyond the cachet of the CIA in the popular mind and,
it seems, in Beecher’s. If Rathmell’s interpretation is correct, then Beecher’s efforts to associate himself with the glamorous CIA was not the first time that the
man from Peck, Kansas, had earnestly endeavored to break into an inner circle.
Although it is often asserted that Beecher changed his named from Unangst in
order to fit into elite New England society (a claim that the present author has
made in previous writings), in fact the name change occurred years before, while
Beecher was a University of Kansas undergraduate, apparently as an act of defiance against his father (Gionfriddo 2007).Though there was no connection other
than some distantly related Beechers on his mother’s side, his new name implied
descent from the great family that produced the abolitionist preacher Henry Ward
Beecher and his sister, Harriet Beecher Stowe. Though the name change does
not appear to have been intended as strategic and Beecher himself preferred not
to talk about it, no doubt it proved helpful as the Midwesterner from modest
circumstances attempted to remake himself as a Boston Brahmin at Harvard. And
there did turn out to be a poetic truth in the Beecher identity. In his later work on
research ethics, Beecher became a kind of social reformer himself, mainly through
his famous whistle-blower paper in the New England Journal of Medicine in 1966.
But his views about research ethics were far more complex than that paper alone
might indicate.

Turn On
In 1940, while Beecher was settling in at Harvard as the nation’s first chaired professor of anesthesiology, Timothy Leary was having a tough time in his plebe year
at West Point, earning multiple demerits for violations of academy rules. Partly
owing to some clever machinations on Leary’s part, an Honors Committee expul-
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sion was later reversed, and he was granted an honorable discharge from the Point.
His next stop was the University of Alabama, where he did well in classes on psychology and biology until he was expelled for spending a night in the women’s
dorm. Drafted into the Army, Leary benefitted from the U.S. military’s intense
interest in psychology, as he was assigned to an academic program and worked in
psychometrics at a Pennsylvania hospital, ending up with several medals and the
rank of sergeant (Greenfield 2006).
Over the next 15 years, Leary enjoyed professional success but experienced
personal tragedy. It is hard to tell if the ragged course of his life as a young man
was caused by his erratic behavior, but in retrospect it foretold a temperament
well-suited to the social dislocations of the 1960s. He earned a PhD from Berkeley in personality psychology where he was appointed an assistant professor, took
a year in Spain on a research grant, and was appointed director of psychiatric
research at the Kaiser Family Foundation. In 1955, Marianne Leary committed
suicide, leaving him to care for their two young children. Shortly thereafter, while
Leary was in Florence, Italy, exhausting his assets after trying to write a novel,
Leary came to the attention of David McClelland, who was there on sabbatical.
McClelland recruited him to join Harvard’s Department of Psychology and Social Relations as a research assistant professor. By then Leary’s research interests
had turned toward the role of interpersonal relations in personality development
and disorders, which fit well with McClelland’s interests and with those of other
members of the department.
While Leary was in Florence he also had a visit from a former Berkeley colleague, who raved about his experience with “magic mushrooms” in Mexico.
Leary had already expressed skepticism about traditional psychotherapy based on
his previous research, but he wasn’t ready to embrace the notion that these fungi
could produce insight. However, after starting his Harvard position in 1960, he
took a vacation in Cuernavaca, where he had his first psychedelic experience.
Back on campus, he established the Harvard Psilocybin Project with his young
colleague Richard Alpert, later known as Baba Ram Dass. The colleagues wanted
to determine if psilocybin (which also happened to have been synthesized from
mushrooms by Hoffman at Sandoz, and was still legal) could help rehabilitate
prisoners, many of whom needed to resolve emotional problems in order to deal
with life on the outside. In 1963, Leary claimed a 23% reduction in the recidivism
rate, but a subsequent review by Rick Doblin has concluded that there was only
a 2.3% reduction, well short of a significant treatment effect (Greenfield 2006).
Far from being outliers, Leary and Alpert’s initial work with psilocybin operated under the full approval of department elders like Henry Murray, considered
the father of personality theory and the senior psychologist for the OSS during
World War II (Lee and Shlain 1986). Murray wrote an assessment of Adolf Hitler
that accurately predicted his suicide. Obsessed with the mystical qualities of Herman Melville’s Moby Dick, Murray had his own rebellious, even bohemian streak.
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He had an ongoing conflict with what he considered the unimaginative postwar
social science establishment. In the 1950s, he conducted a humiliation experiment
with Harvard undergraduates, one of whom was Ted Kaczynski, later known as
the Unabomber (Moreno 2014). In addition to Murray, Leary also enjoyed the
sage advice of Aldous Huxley, who was lecturing at MIT and participated in psilocybin experiments, although he later dissociated himself from Leary’s approach
to hallucinogens (Lee and Shlain 1986).
Leary and his graduate students ran monthly psilocybin sessions for a dozen
prisoners over nine months, combined with group therapy and personality tests.
“According to Leary’s findings,” writes Don Lattin in The Harvard Psychedelic Club
(2010), “these follow-up tests showed less depression and hostility, more responsibility and cooperation. More prisoners signed up for the experiment” (62). Leary
was far from alone in thinking that hallucinogens could help with psychological
problems, especially LSD; if anything, the young Americans were latecomers, as
research had been conducted since the early 1950s in both the United States and
Europe (Grof 2001). In 1954, psychiatrist Ronnie Sandison published a paper
in the Journal of Mental Science about Sandoz-supplied LSD for psychotherapy at
Powick Hospital in Worcestershire (Roberts 2012). And Joshua Bierer, a pioneer
of community psychiatry, published in 1960 a paper in the Proceedings of the Royal
Society of Medicine called “An Experiment with a Psychiatric Night Hospital” in
which he described the LSD treatment of 54 patients (Bierer and Browne 1960).
One of Bierer’s protégés, the psychiatrist John Buckman, accepted a position at
the University of Virginia in 1966, only to discover that legal access to the drug
on which he had based his research career had been restricted and, in 1970, prohibited. Like so many others in his generation of psychiatrists, to the end of his
life Buckman continued to believe that under certain circumstances LSD-psychotherapy could be helpful for some carefully screened patients (Maurer 2013).

Drop Out
In spite of McClelland’s repeated requests for controlled data from their experiments, Leary and Alpert resisted conforming to the trial methodology that was
taking hold in the rest of the life sciences world. Finally, other members of the
department began to complain that Leary and Alpert were pressuring graduate students into taking hallucinogens. His patience eroding, McClelland called a
meeting where social psychologist Herbert Kelman criticized the junior professors’ “nonchalant attitude toward these experiments—especially considering the
effects these drugs might have on the subjects” (Lattin 2010, 88). Alpert responded
that the experiments were in the spirit of William James, who was interested in
altered states of consciousness. The next day the Harvard Crimson broke the story
under the headline “Psychologists Disagree on Psilocybin Research.” A day after
the Crimson story, the Boston Herald ran the headline “Hallucination Drug Fought
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at Harvard: 350 Students Take Pills,” though many were more accurately identified as “subjects” in the story itself. Leary and Alpert agreed to have psychiatrist
and health services director Dana L. Farnsworth hold their stock of psilocybin
(Greenfield 2006). As the term came to a close for the summer, the matter seemed
to be resolved.
However, Leary and Alpert broke the spirit if not the letter of the agreement
even before the ink had dried. Leary was the academic adviser for a doctoral student in religion and society named Walter Pahnke, a psychiatrist with a deep interest in hallucinogens. On Good Friday 1962, Pahnke gathered 20 students from
the Andover Newton Theological Seminary at Boston University’s Marsh Chapel
to engage in what was supposed to be a double-blind psilocybin experiment
with nicotinic acid as the placebo control drug for half the students, followed by
questionnaires to assess whether they had had a mystical experience.The drug was
provided by Leary, who had obtained a legal prescription from a local physician.
But Leary was critical of the notion that a double-blind study could be done with
psychedelics. Indeed, one participant, convinced that he needed to announce the
dawning of the Messianic Age, had to be chased down Commonwealth Avenue
by MIT philosopher Huston Smith and returned to the chapel where Pahnke
gave him a shot of Thorazine (Greenfield 2006).
Over the summer of 1962, Harvard officials worried about the risks Leary and
Alpert posed to students. The deal that kept psilocybin under lock and key did
not apply to LSD. When classes resumed in the fall, Harvard College Dean John
Monro and health services director Farnsworth wrote a joint letter to the Crimson, warning students that both LSD and psilocybin “may result in serious hazard
to the mental health and stability even of apparently normal persons” (Harrington
1964, 86).1 Then a new Crimson reporter, Andrew Weil, later to achieve fame as
an authority on holistic health, asked to be assigned to the story. He, too, was fascinated with psychedelics. He used Harvard stationery to obtain psilocybin pills
from a drug distributor and, independently of Leary’s group but inspired by them,
experimented with the drug. Along with several other undergraduates Weil wrote
up reports of their experiences (Lattin 2010).
Weil has since confirmed that he was providing information against Alpert to
the Harvard administration. His investigative reporting appeared not only in his
college newspaper but also in a Look magazine article in November 1963, quite a
coup for a young journalist. In that piece,Weil reported that “One Harvard junior
told a friend that Alpert had persuaded him to take psilocybin in a ‘self-exploratory’ session at Alpert’s apartment,” and that “There were stories of students and
others using hallucinogens for seductions, both heterosexual and homosexual”
(Lattin 2010, 95). These stories have been disputed by the two young psycholo1
Farnsworth also editorialized against LSD and its kind in JAMA and was vice-chair of the National
Commission on Marijuana and Drug Abuse from 1971 to 1973 (Saxon 1986). Beecher recruited him
for the Ad Hoc Committee on Brain Death in 1968 (Belkin 2014).
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gists’ defenders, but they had the intended effect. Soon after the Crimson exposé
ran in May 1963, Alpert was fired for sharing drugs with a student and Leary for
failing to meet his classes (Greenfield 2006, 196).They appear to have been the
only Harvard faculty members who were fired in the 20th century.
No doubt Henry Beecher observed these developments at his university with
keen interest, and not only because these rebellious young psychologists were
working with substances that had fascinated him and been part of his research
program for more than a decade before Leary arrived in Cambridge. As an investigator who conducted and advocated for randomized controlled trials, he would
have noted the lack of rigorous controls in Leary’s experiments. Beecher was also
concerned that the prerogatives of legitimate and responsible scientific investigators not be contaminated by association with questionable activities. In his 1959
JAMA article “Experimentation in Man,” Beecher repeatedly alludes to the responsibility of the investigator and approvingly quotes Ladimer: “The responsible
professions have a duty to delineate for their own members and for a critically
vigilant public the nature of medical research and the limits within which it may
be properly undertaken” (Beecher 1959, 111). In 1961 and 1962, while the crisis
with the Leary-Alpert psilocybin project was unfolding, he was a member of a
Harvard Medical School faculty committee that objected to the Army’s insertion
of the Nuremberg Code into its research contracts with the medical school. The
inclusion of such “principles” was offensive to the committee partly because the
Code had its origins in the judicial response to the Nazi concentration camp experiments. Imputing even the possibility of such gross irresponsibility to Harvard
scientists was unacceptable (Advisory Committee 1996). Beecher’s objections to
both the psilocybin project and the Army’s contract language proceeded from the
same conviction: that legitimate medical science research must be protected from
perceptions that it bears any resemblance to experiments that were gross violations of medical ethics. (At the same time, he objected to the imposition of rigid
rules on legitimate researchers, including some provisions of the Code.)
Beecher’s determination to protect the reputation of legitimate research, and
his obvious interest in the whole controversy, was reflected in his response to that
argument in a special issue of the Harvard Alumni Bulletin in the fall of 1963, after
Leary and Alpert had been forced out. Beecher said that there was no reason to
think that appropriate experiments could not be done in public view. On the
contrary, Beecher wrote that there was “an abundance of support in this field for
the able, responsible investigator, at present more than ever before.” It’s not clear
what abundant support Beecher had in mind, nor what he meant by “this field.”
Perhaps he was thinking about the Army’s support of his research a decade before,
or federal funding for studies of psychoactive drugs. Like McClellan and the other
senior psychology faculty, Beecher also objected to the lack of rigor in Leary’s
drug experiments: “This reminds me of De Quincy’s Confessions of an English
Opium Eater . . . rather than a present-day scientific study of subjective responses to
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drugs” (Lee and Shlain 1986). But as Leary’s biographer points out, ever since he
first experienced the effects of magic mushrooms in 1960 controlled experiments
were of no interest to Leary (Greenfield 2006).
As a member of the medical school faculty, Beecher did not have a direct role
in the pressure put on Leary, but as a highly regarded authority on drug experiments, including those involving hallucinogens, his views would have been noted
and can only have strengthened the case against both Leary and Alpert. Before his
item for the alumni newsletter, Beecher published a paper in Clinical Pharmacology
and Therapeutics in which he allowed that “there is nothing wrong with the principle of consent,” but in pursuit of this aspirational principle “it seems necessary
to rely on the knowledge and competence, on the consideration and good will,
on the integrity and absolute honesty of the investigator” (Beecher 1962, 141). It
was because he appreciated the burden that this philosophy of virtue ethics placed
upon the individual investigator that Beecher felt so strongly about repudiating
posers like Leary. The fact that the experiments in question could so easily be
confused with his own LSD studies—conducted without informed consent according to Louis Lasagna—made it still more imperative that a line be drawn. In
Beecher’s eyes at least, unlike Leary he was a responsible investigator who could
be trusted with the care of human subjects even without their full consent.Yet in
defending his experiments, Leary insisted that all of his subjects were “informed
volunteers” (Weil 1963). Thus, between the responsible investigator (as Beecher
would have defined that term) and informed consent as more protective of human subjects, Beecher’s emphasis was on the former, while Leary’s was on the
latter (though how seriously Leary took a consent standard and what he meant by
it is surely open to debate).
In 1966, Beecher published his famous paper, “Ethics and Clinical Research.”
No psychedelic studies were included in his list of 22 ethically questionable experiments. Perhaps the psychedelic studies of Leary and Alpert were so far beyond
the pale that they weren’t even worthy of mention as unethical. And Beecher’s
focus was on research with sick patients, not with healthy, normal volunteers.
From his point of view, nothing that Leary and his associates did would have met
even a minimal standard of methodological soundness, though his own studies
with LSD presumably would have. Beecher did not take his New England Journal
of Medicine paper as an occasion for self-criticism. Besides his apparently nonconsensual LSD studies, he had more recently conducted studies of the effect of
amphetamine and secobarbital (marketed as Seconal) on athletic performance.
The drugs were tested against placebo and the results published in the Journal of
the American Medical Association in 1960 (Smith and Beecher 1960). One of the 15
subjects was Daniel Callahan, later the co-founder of the Hastings Center which
established its ethics award in Beecher’s name. Callahan recalled the experience in
an email to the author:
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When I was a grad student at Harvard in 1960 or so, a notice appeared in the
paper that a research project was beginning that called for the participation of
former swimmers and runners. I had been a swimmer in college. We were not
told the goal of the research or who was running it. What they did was ask us
to drink some pink stuff and then swim 100 yards at full speed (4 lengths of the
pool) and be timed in the process. We then had a ten or fifteen-minute break
and once again had to swim 100 yards, drinking the pink liquid once again.
Then a few days later we repeated the whole process. In the first rounds the
time for the second swim was always slower than the first one—as would be
expected since the time waiting between the two swims was not enough for a
good rest.
But we went on to further sequences and suddenly the time for the second swim in the cycle was faster than the first. It became evident that something
was different in the 2d pink liquid since it was otherwise implausible that would
happen. We were not told what the research was about nor did I know the name
of the person directing the swims; and I don’t think there was any informed
consent. [The published paper states that “The subjects were told that ‘pep pills’
and placebo were being used.”]
Then, around 1971 or so I read Beecher’s CV since he was part of our
[the Hastings Center’s] project on brain death. I noticed in his list of publications a project he had run on amphetamines that had involved swimmers and
runners in the early 1960s—and that’s how I first learned what the research was
and who had run it! Sidney [Dan’s wife] recalls it well because I came home
after the trials with the faster second dose high, happy, and agitated—and then
in a few hours became very nasty. (Personal communication, Nov. 25, 2014)

Beecher took advantage of another opportunity to make his case about psychedelics in 1968, when the Harvard Divinity School’s Ingersoll Lecture on Immortality was delivered by Walter Pahnke, the psychiatrist and divinity school
graduate who had organized the Easter Sunday psilocybin event six years before. Beecher was invited to respond from the physician’s point of view (Beecher
1969). Pahnke was a devotee of the use of LSD with terminally ill cancer patients,
which he associated with the nascent bioethical movement in favor of telling
grave ill people the truth about their condition. Pahnke hypothesized that their
anxiety and despair could be alleviated with the mystical experience that the drug
made possible. Then on the staff of the Maryland Psychiatric Research Center,
the experiments themselves were conducted at the Sinai Hospital in Baltimore.
The Maryland studies were sympathetically depicted in a CBS News television
documentary in 1965 (CBS Reports 1965). Pahnke (1969) reported that 17 patients had been given LSD and psychotherapy with informed consent, that none
were harmed, and that their fears of death was lessened. In an assertion that would
have especially interested Beecher, Pahnke said that “Sometimes the need for pain
medication was lessened, but mainly because the patient was able to tolerate what
pain he felt more easily” (12). Pahnke associated the benefits of the psychedelic
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experience for those who fear the loss of selfhood in death with William James’s
observations about what James had called the “Vaster Consciousness of Reality”
in his Ingersoll Lecture 70 years before.
Beecher’s response to his fellow physician Pahnke was diplomatic but unyielding on both the methodology and the ethics. Referencing his long experience
with “subjective responses,” Beecher (1969) wrote that Pahnke’s study “was done
without controls, and I am sorry about that. . . . We now know how powerful the
pain pill, the sugar pill, can be” (21). Surely we would not be surprised that a dying
patient taken outdoors on a cool and fresh morning, greeted warmly by physicians and therapists, taken into in a “rosebud warm” treatment room, given a bowl
of succulent fruit, played delightful music and surrounded by pictures of his family
would have a favorable reaction to the drug, he objected. Nor could the dangers
of LSD be waved aside, as Pahnke attempted to do. Beecher argued: “I think one
has no right to take a group of young people and administer large doses of LSD
to them for experimental purposes unless—and this is a very large ‘unless’—one
knows that they understand the hazards and truly consent to participation in a
proper study under correct circumstances” (23). Here Beecher may have recalled
his own unconsented LSD experiments a decade before. Finally, echoing a statement in the Nuremberg Code, Beecher asserted that any poorly designed human
experiment is an unethical experiment.
Moreover, Beecher was also concerned that studies like Pahnke’s take care to
respect the privacy of the patients. Beecher seemed to think that violations of the
right to privacy were a special problem in behavioral studies, citing the surge in
the production of social scientists and in federal support of social science in the
late 1960s. This aspect of Beecher’s thinking has gone largely unnoticed, but it
is quite revealing, as he seems to have believed that behavioral science was not
only especially threatening to basic human rights but also might jeopardize public
confidence in scientific research more generally: “It would be most unfortunate
if the social scientist became identified with violations of privacy, with snooping”
(26). (Perhaps he was thinking of Stanley Milgram’s “obedience to authority” and
especially Laud Humphrey’s “tearoom trade” studies, which had received a great
deal of media attention.) The ability of scientists to self-police was being challenged by regulators and legislators who threatened to impose “seriously restrictive and coercive legislation” (26). Indeed, as Beecher would surely have known,
influential members of Congress were already proposing a national commission
on the subject of human research protections.
Thus, 15 years after his own LSD research, Beecher had come to see poorly
designed studies like Leary’s and Pahnke’s as emblematic of a larger problem facing science. Perceiving the pressures for increased regulation of human studies that
his 1966 New England Journal of Medicine paper had helped to stimulate, Beecher
hoped that scientists could stay ahead of the “restrictive” trends, but he seems not
to have been all that optimistic. Although he did not specifically express the point,
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studies with substances like LSD, about to be classified as a Schedule 1 drug under
the 1970 Controlled Substances Act, could only further confuse the issue and
threaten legitimate science. At the very least, Beecher decided, he could flag the
kinds of studies that posed the most danger to responsible scientists’ prerogatives,
including one so publicly described as Pahnke’s.

Get Well
Beecher’s 1969 exchange in the Harvard Theological Review was reprinted two years
later in the Journal of Psychedelic Studies, of which Leary had been the first editor.
Perhaps Beecher was unaware of the plans to republish the discussion. In any case,
by then the question of legal research on LSD, psilocybin, mescaline, and the other
drugs of such interest to both of them was academic, as their use for any reason—
recreational, spiritual or scientific—was illegal. According to the pharmacologist
David Nichols (2013), “between the 1950s and mid-1960s more than 1,000 clinical papers were published describing 40,000 patients, several dozen books, and six
international conferences on LSD-assisted psychotherapy. All that came to a sudden stop.” He argues that the birth of neuroscience itself might be dated to 1954,
when LSD was found to affect the serotonin system, an ancient and remarkably
versatile neurotransmitter that is crucial for digestion, growth, and reproduction.
Modern antidepressants called SSRIs (selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors) increase the availability of serotonin in the brain. As for LSD-assisted psychotherapy
and its related spiritual experiences, a generation of stigmatization encased in law
is only grudgingly giving way, as organizations like MAPS (the Multidisciplinary
Association for Psychedelic Studies) are permitted to conduct well-controlled
clinical studies in LSD for anxiety caused by life-threatening illness, as well as
experiments with MDMA, marijuana, and ayahuasca (www.maps.org).
The federal government’s 1970 determination that these and other substances
had significant potential for abuse with no safe and accepted medical use was a
response to news reports that unsupervised recreational use was rising rapidly
among young people. As the most publicly prominent advocate of LSD, Leary’s
antics served as a focus for the problem, a situation that Beecher seems to have
perceived. His broader fears about the regulation of science were vindicated as
well. During the early 1970s, a series of scandals led to the adoption of the Common Rule in 1981, a regime that does not distinguish between behavioral and
biomedical research, despite Beecher’s biologically centered view that one was a
far more unjustified threat to privacy and human rights than the latter. Beecher
(himself an IRB chair) would surely have had mixed feelings about the research
ethics industry that has grown up since his death, but he would certainly have
been among the first to sign onto the renewed interest in LSD and the secrets of
the human brain that it might unlock.
As Beecher’s interest in research ethics blossomed, did he finally come to see
some of his clinical studies as incompatible with those values, including some of
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the LSD experiments? Though it is tempting to reach the conclusion that Beecher had a change of heart, there is no direct evidence to support that view.What we
do know is that Beecher wanted to protect the virtuous, responsible investigator
from what he regarded as excessive regulation that could impede scientific inquiry, and that he saw the activities of people like Leary as a threat to the independence of legitimate science. The outcome of the struggle over the proper use of
substances likes LSD in the 1960s signaled the beginning of an era of restrictions
on scientific freedom that Beecher feared.
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